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Abstract 10 
People across societies engage in costly sharing, but the extent of such sharing shows striking cultural 11 
variation, highlighting the importance of local norms in shaping generosity. Despite this acknowledged role 12 
for norms, it is unclear when they begin to exert their influence in development. Here we use a Dictator 13 
Game to investigate the extent to which 4- to 9-year-old children are sensitive to selfish (give 20%) and 14 
generous (give 80%) norms. Additionally, we varied whether children were told how much other children 15 
give (descriptive norm) or what they should give according to an adult (injunctive norm). Results showed 16 
that children generally gave more when they were exposed to a generous norm. However, patterns of 17 
compliance varied with age. Younger children were more likely to comply with the selfish norm, 18 
suggesting a licensing effect. By contrast, older children were more influenced by the generous norm, yet 19 
capped their donations at 50%, perhaps adhering to a pre-existing norm of equality. Children were not 20 
differentially influenced by descriptive or injunctive norms, suggesting a primacy of norm content over 21 
norm format. Together, our findings indicate that while generosity is malleable in children, normative 22 
information does not completely override pre-existing biases.  23 
 24 
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Introduction 27 
People everywhere engage in costly prosocial behavior, ranging from every-day acts like volunteering time 28 
at community events to more tangible gestures like giving away a proportion of one’s earnings to charity. 29 
Indeed, according to Giving USA, in the last year people in the USA alone gave an estimated $358.38 30 
billion dollars to charity (more than $1,000 per adult) highlighting the economic importance of 31 
understanding the mechanisms supporting generosity in humans. 32 
A great deal of work by economists and psychologists has shown that generous behavior can be 33 
readily elicited under laboratory conditions. The most widely used task for capturing generosity in the lab is 34 
the Dictator Game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). In this game, one person—the dictator—is given 35 
a sum of money and is asked to allocate the endowment between themselves and a passive recipient. While 36 
traditional economic models predict that dictators will keep the entire endowment for themselves because 37 
any donation necessarily reduces the dictator’s payoff, dictators typically share a portion of their 38 
endowment with partners (Engel, 2011). A further striking finding from work on the Dictator Game is that 39 
the amount shared with partners shows dramatic variation across different societies (Henrich, Boyd, 40 
Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis et al., 2005). For instance, in one cross-cultural investigation of Dictator 41 
Game giving, Hadza participants offered a 20% share on average, while Tsimane participants typically 42 
offered ten percent more (Henrich et al., 2005). In these two societies, few people kept everything for 43 
themselves, in contrast to American participants, many of whom refused to share at all (Camerer, 2003). 44 
This cultural variation demonstrates that while generosity may be a common human behavior, what 45 
constitutes generosity is profoundly shaped by local norms.  46 
An influential approach to addressing how norms affect behavior begins by distinguishing 47 
between two different types of normative information, what we refer to here as norm format. Descriptive 48 
norms describe what others are doing, while injunctive norms describe what ought to be done to earn social 49 
approval (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Descriptive and injunctive norms have garnered a great deal 50 
of attention in social psychology and each appears to influence people’s behavior in a range of social 51 
situations including littering (Cialdini et al., 1990), taking resources from a national park (Cialdini, 52 
Demaine, Sagarin, & Barrett, 2006) and household energy consumption (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, 53 
Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). Theoretically, the distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms 54 
may be further explored by placing it in a more evolutionarily informed framework, namely by thinking of 55 
it as analogous to the distinction between horizontal and oblique transmission (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; 56 
Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). While this framework must be qualified by acknowledging that both 57 
descriptive and injunctive norms can, in principle, be transmitted horizontally or obliquely, this can serve 58 
as a useful foundation for thinking about which models are most relevant for children at different stages in 59 
development. Horizontal transmission, as the name implies, is transmission of information between peers. 60 
One central route for horizontal transmission is direct observation of statistical tendencies, i.e., the learning 61 
of descriptive norms of who generally does what. Oblique transmission involves acquiring skills and 62 
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knowledge, including explicit rules of conduct, i.e. injunctive norms. Oblique transmission is importantly 63 
distinct from vertical transmission, which involves learning specifically from parents. While much early 64 
learning happens from parents, children begin to increasingly rely on horizontal and oblique transmission 65 
as they age (Hewlett et al., 2011). However, the extent to which children differentially weigh normative 66 
information from peers versus adults remains unclear. An emerging picture from developmental work 67 
suggests that young children have an initial tendency to rely on adults for social information (Jaswal & 68 
Neely, 2006; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010), which hints at a particular sensitivity to injunctive 69 
norms. By contrast, older children are thought to be particularly sensitive to peer influence (Brown, 1990), 70 
pointing to the importance of descriptive norms later in development. However, it is not yet know if these 71 
same patterns hold when examining children’s adherence to norms of generosity.  72 
Some recent work has, however, investigated norm format in the context of adults’ giving in the 73 
Dictator Game (Bicchieri & Xiao, 2007; Raihani & McAuliffe, 2014). Bicchieri and Xiao (2007) found that 74 
fair behavior was more affected by participants’ expectations of what others give in the dictator game (i.e., 75 
a descriptive norm) as opposed to expectations of what ought to be given (an injunctive norm). However, 76 
Raihani and McAuliffe’s (2014) results did not accord with these findings. They presented dictators with a 77 
descriptive norm, an injunctive norm or no normative information. Within norm format, participants saw 78 
either a stingy norm (give at least 20%) or a generous norm (give at least 50%). They found that people 79 
were sensitive to both norm content (stingy vs. generous) as well as norm format (injunctive vs. 80 
descriptive). Specifically, people gave more when presented with the generous norm than the stingy norm, 81 
and injunctive norms increased the propensity to give at least the target amount, whereas descriptive norms 82 
did not. Minimally, results from these two studies show that giving behavior is flexible: people’s generosity 83 
is susceptible to the power of suggestion. However, the extent to which giving behavior is differentially 84 
influenced by descriptive versus injunctive norms remains unclear, and in particular, little is known about 85 
how or even whether children are sensitive to different norm formats. 86 
Taken together, previous studies of Dictator Game giving in adults have clearly demonstrated that 87 
generosity shows natural variation across cultures, and suggest that the transmission of normative 88 
information is one potential mechanism by which that variation can be maintained. However, the 89 
developmental roots of normative influence are as yet unclear. In particular, it remains possible that 90 
children hold strong pre-existing biases, for example towards selfishness (e.g., Benenson, Pascoe, & 91 
Radmore, 2007) that limit the influence of normative information earlier in development. Alternatively, the 92 
nature of selfishness versus generosity might itself be open to revision via normative information from 93 
early childhood, in which case, children, like adults would be sensitive to locally presented norms. 94 
Addressing these issues is critical to understanding how and when cultural variation emerges, as well as 95 
how and when we might intervene on developing notions of fairness and generosity.  96 
Broadly past work on children’s donations in the Dictator Game demonstrates that, from relatively 97 
early in development, children are motivated to share with others, even when doing so comes at a personal 98 
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cost. Children as young as four willingly offer resources to peers across a variety of experimental games 99 
(Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; House, Henrich, Brosnan, & Silk, 2012; Moore, 2009). Of 100 
particular relevance here are a number of studies that have examined children’s sharing behavior using 101 
different versions of the Dictator Game (Benenson et al., 2007; Blake, Corbit, Callaghan, & Warneken, 102 
2016; Blake & Rand, 2010; Cowell et al., 2016; Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010; 103 
Rochat et al., 2009; Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). While results from these studies are not entirely 104 
consistent, several trends have emerged: First, young children tend to show a selfish bias that is attenuated 105 
with age (Beneson et al., 2007; Cowell et al., 2016; Rochat et al., 2009). Second, older children tend to be 106 
more equitable than younger children (Fehr et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2013). Third, children rarely give 107 
more than an equal split (Benenson et al., 2007; Blake & Rand, 2010).  108 
 In parallel to work on children’s emerging prosociality, other work has shown that an 109 
understanding of norms is present from early in ontogeny. For instance, Powell and colleagues (2013) 110 
showed that even infants expect similar individuals to behave in the same way, suggesting that humans are 111 
predisposed to attend to group norms and that these norms guide expectations of how individuals should 112 
act. These expectations appear to persist over the course of ontogeny and drive children to intervene to 113 
prevent norm violations in others (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2012; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008). 114 
More specifically, children as young as two years of age respond to norm violations (Rakoczy et al., 2008), 115 
and by three children explicitly correct others’ behavior (Rakoczy et al., 2008) and are particularly likely to 116 
enforce norm violations committed by an in-group member (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012). 117 
Another recent line of work has begun to investigate how children’s understanding of norms 118 
influences their prosocial behavior, and begins to explore potential divergences between understanding of 119 
what one ought to do (injunctive information) and expectations about what one will do (descriptive 120 
information). For instance, Smith and colleagues (2013) showed that American children between the ages 121 
of three and eight understand that they ought to share equally and even expect others to share equally with 122 
them. Despite this understanding of what they should do, however, it is not until around the age of seven 123 
that children actually begin to adhere to this norm of equality. Blake and colleagues (2014) found a similar 124 
gap between what children think they should do and what they actually do and showed that children with 125 
better self-regulation close this gap faster than those with poor self-regulation. Finally, in a cross-society 126 
study of prosocial behavior, House and colleagues (2013) found that children begin to adopt adult-typical 127 
patterns of prosocial behavior around middle childhood, suggesting it is not until this period in ontogeny 128 
that children begin to internalize their society’s norms of generosity. Together, these studies suggest that 129 
from early in development children become aware of norms of giving in their respective societies and that 130 
they ultimately follow those norms. However, two key questions remain unanswered, and are the focus of 131 
the present study. First, does norm format affect children’s generosity? That is, will children be 132 
differentially influenced by norms about what their peers are doing (descriptive) versus norms about what 133 
they ought to do (injunctive)? Second, are children differentially influenced by norms with different 134 
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content, such as those that prescribe selfishness versus generosity? We address these questions by 135 
investigating children’s costly giving in the Dictator Game. Children are presented with a selfish (give 136 
20%) or generous (give 80%) norm and we test whether their donations vary in response to these norms 137 
relative to their donations in a condition in which they are not given normative information. In addition to 138 
varying norm content, we also vary the format of norm that is presented: they either learn what other 139 
children do (descriptive norm) or they learn what should be done from the perspective of an authority 140 
figure (injunctive norm). Based on past work, we predict that younger children will be less inclined to share 141 
than older children. We expect to see this age effect regardless of norm condition, but are particularly 142 
interested in whether the content (selfish or generous) or format (descriptive or injunctive) of norms can 143 
move children away from their age-typical giving behavior. More specifically, the proposed shift from 144 
oblique to horizontal transmission (and so from a reliance on injunctive to descriptive norms) raises the 145 
possibility that younger children will be relatively more sensitive to injunctive information than older 146 
children, and vice versa for descriptive information. We thus set out to examine children’s susceptibility to 147 
influence from normative information across early and middle childhood with the aim of clarifying how 148 
they are affected by norms that differ in format (descriptive versus injunctive) and content (selfish versus 149 
generous). 150 
Methods 151 
Participants 152 
We included 268 children. We tested children between the ages of four and nine, as this age group has been 153 
successfully tested in the Dictator Game in previous studies and thus allows us to compare our results to 154 
past work (Benenson et al., 2007). Children were divided into three age groups: 4&5 (N = 90, Mean 155 
(months) ± Standard deviation = 60.4 ± 6.8, 47 Females (F)), 6&7 (N = 94, 82.6 ± 7.3, 48F) and 8&9 (N = 156 
84, 107.4 ± 7.2, 41F). For ten of our participants we were missing a precise age due to incomplete birthdate 157 
information. For those children, ages were estimated from other information on the consent form or from 158 
conversations with the child (N = 3), or children were estimated to be their age in years plus six months (N 159 
= 7). We recruited participants in parks, museums, festivals and a lab in New Haven, CT. We received 160 
informed consent from parents and assent from children prior to participation. Fifty-five additional children 161 
were tested but excluded from the final sample because they failed comprehension (9) or manipulation (33) 162 
checks (see Procedure for details), due to experimenter error (9) or due to parental interference (4). 163 
Twenty-four additional children participated but were excluded prior to testing based on pre-specified 164 
criteria (e.g. non-English speakers, outside of age range, did not like food resource used). They participated 165 
because we wanted to give any interested child the chance to play the game. Our sample size determination 166 
was based on a pre-specified target of 20 children per each of 15 design cells. We continued to add children 167 
to cells when other children were excluded for the pre-specified criteria described above and exceeded our 168 
exact target because we continued to test when we had additional time on-site at a testing session.  169 
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Design 170 
Children played a one-shot anonymous Dictator Game with an imaginary peer. We used a between-subject 171 
design in which children were assigned to one of three norm conditions: injunctive, descriptive or a control 172 
in which no norm information was presented (see Table S1 for sample breakdown). Within the injunctive 173 
and descriptive conditions, children were assigned to one of two treatments: a selfish norm treatment (give 174 
2 out of 10) or a generous norm treatment (give 8 out of 10).  175 
Procedure 176 
We based our procedure on previous Dictator Game methods that have been successfully employed with 177 
children in this age range (Blake et al., 2014; Blake & Rand, 2009). Participants were introduced to the 178 
rewards being used (Starburst candies), asked if they liked them, and given a choice between playing with 179 
two different colors. If a child had never tried a Starburst, they were given the opportunity to do so in order 180 
to ensure that they were motivated by the resource. Children were then given ten candies and told that they 181 
were theirs to keep and that they could do whatever they wanted with them. By assigning ownership in this 182 
way we were able to ask about children’s generosity. That is, their willingness to share their own resources. 183 
The candies were counted out in front of the child in two rows of five. They were then introduced to two 184 
paper bags: one bag was for them and one bag was for another child who would be coming to play later. It 185 
was explained that they could keep as many candies as they wanted and they could give as many as they 186 
wanted to the other child. They were then introduced to one of the condition/treatment combinations or 187 
were tested in the no-norm control condition. In the injunctive condition the experimenter said: “I think you 188 
should give 2/8 to the other child”. In the descriptive condition, the experimenter said: “most kids that play 189 
this game give 2/8 to the other child”. To make the divisions more salient to the child, the experimenter 190 
physically moved the candies on top of the child’s bag and the recipient’s bag to demonstrate the giving 191 
norms. The candies were then placed back in front of the child in two rows of five. In the control, no 192 
information about donation behavior was described. Children were then introduced to a “privacy box”, a 193 
large cardboard box that sat over the study area such that the child could make their decision out of view. 194 
Children were also explicitly told that no one would see them make their decision.  195 
To ensure that children understood all aspects of the game, they were asked four comprehension 196 
questions before making their decision about how to divide the candy. They were asked (1) to whom the 197 
candies belonged; (2) to identify their paper bag; (3) to identify the paper bag of their partner; and (4) 198 
whether anyone could see them in the privacy box. The majority of children spontaneously passed these 199 
checks (89%, 91%, 98%, 95%). If a child did not answer correctly, they were given another explanation 200 
and the comprehension question was re-asked. If children continued to fail these pre-decision 201 
comprehension checks, they were excluded (see above for number of excluded children). In three cases, the 202 
experimenter re-explained but forgot to re-ask a comprehension question. Given that children 203 
overwhelmingly passed comprehension checks after the second explanation, these children were included 204 
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in the final sample. After making their decisions, the children were again asked to identify their bag and 205 
asked what would happen to the candies in the partner’s bag. Because these questions were asked after 206 
children had made their decisions, they were not used as exclusion criteria. 207 
To ensure that children had attended to the norm information that we provided, children in 208 
injunctive and descriptive conditions were asked to remember the norm content (selfish: give 2 or 209 
generous: give 8) before taking their candies home. Children who did not pass this manipulation check 210 
were excluded from the sample (see above). Because this entailed rejecting children from these conditions 211 
at a higher rate than the control (which did not have a manipulation check), we ran additional analyses that 212 
included the children who failed the manipulation check. Including these children did not change the 213 
overall pattern of results (see Table S2). Following these checks, children were debriefed: it was explained 214 
that another child would be coming but might not get the specific candies that had been donated and that 215 
the norm information was not necessarily true. 216 
Early in the study we made a minor change to the script. Notably, experimenters had initially 217 
followed the norm manipulation described above with the phrase “that’s just what I think you should do 218 
(injunctive) / others are doing (descriptive).” This was done to ensure that children understood that they 219 
were free to donate however many they wanted (i.e., so that they did not view the norm as a command). 220 
However, we ultimately determined that this could weaken the normative content and so removed this 221 
phrase, instead, emphasizing that they were free to make whatever decision they wanted. To ensure that this 222 
change did not affect our results, we confirmed that our pattern of our results holds regardless of whether 223 
these initial sessions are included or excluded (Table S6). 224 
Coding and analysis 225 
Data were collected live. If parents provided video consent and the child provided assent (90% of sessions), 226 
a recording was also taken of the task up until the child made a decision. When the child was about to make 227 
a decision in the privacy box, the camera was turned off. After the child made a decision, their bag was 228 
saved and the number of candies inside was counted after they left. The experimenter entered the live data 229 
and, where possible, the experimental videos were later checked to ensure that no experimenter errors had 230 
been made and to double-check comprehension checks. Because children made their decisions in secret, we 231 
do not have video confirmation of their allocation decisions. However, because recording their decisions 232 
required simply counting between zero and ten candies, errors were unlikely to be introduced at this stage 233 
and any errors that did occur should have been equally distributed across conditions.  234 
We performed analyses using three main approaches. We first asked whether average donations 235 
varied across experimental conditions and treatments. Specifically, we asked (1) whether children were 236 
differentially responsive to injunctive or descriptive norms and (2) whether their responsiveness differed 237 
based on receiving  generous versus selfish norm content. Because children in the control condition did not 238 
receive norm information and so could not contribute to a treatment by condition interaction (the main 239 
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predictor of interest for these analyses), this analysis focused only on children in the two test conditions. To 240 
examine whether donations were predicted by condition and treatment, we ran linear models with subject 241 
donation (0 to 10 candies) as the response term and condition (norm format: descriptive, injunctive, 242 
control), treatment (norm content: selfish, generous), age group (4&5, 6&7, 8&9) and gender fit as fixed 243 
effects (see Table 1 for information about base levels). Gender was not found to be a significant predictor 244 
in any of our models. Analyses were also run with age fit as a continuous effect and this did not change the 245 
overall pattern (see SOM for model output from these analyses). Where appropriate based on the analysis at 246 
hand, we included interactions between condition, treatment and age group. To determine which factors 247 
were important predictors of donations we eliminated single terms from a full model using the ‘drop1’ 248 
command. In this way, we assessed whether their inclusion improved model fit using likelihood ratio tests 249 
(LRTs). Based on these tests, we created a minimal model, which included the combination of factors that 250 
provided the best fit to our data.  251 
We next collapsed data across injunctive and descriptive conditions and tested whether children 252 
were differentially influenced by information about selfish and generous target donations. Here we go 253 
beyond an analysis of mean donations to instead examine the distributions of donations in each condition. 254 
The distributional analysis has the advantage of allowing us to distinguish between different possible 255 
patterns of responding with similar means. For example, an analysis of means might not allow us to 256 
distinguish between some children showing large shifts and others not shifting at all, on the one hand, and 257 
many children shifting slightly on the other hand (because these two patterns could involve identical mean 258 
donations). That is, this analysis supplements the analysis of means by providing insight into the 259 
distribution of responses in each condition. We examined distributions within each age group using 260 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. We used bootstrapped Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests (using the ks.boot 261 
command in the “Matching” package; Sekhon, 2011) because donation data were not perfectly continuous 262 
and contained ties. 263 
Finally, we investigated exact compliance to specific norms (i.e., the possibility that a given norm 264 
would lead children to give exactly 2 of 10 or 8 of 10, depending on condition, or that children would give 265 
exactly 5, conforming to a pre-existing norm of equality) using generalized linear models (GLMs) with 266 
norm compliance fit as a binary outcome (complied = 1, did not comply = 0). To assess the importance of 267 
different predictors, we again used LRTs as described above. Again, additional models were run with age 268 
fit as a continuous predictor with qualitatively similar results (see SOM). To assess whether compliance 269 
varied within particular age groups and treatments, we compared the frequency of children who complied 270 
with a given norm (Give 2, Give 8, Give half) in the treatments versus the frequency of children who made 271 
those same donations in the control condition. To do this we conducted Pearson Chi Square tests with 272 
Yates correction. These were used as an alternative to GLMs because output from our initial GLMs on the 273 
subsetted data indicated a convergence issue, most likely due to too few observations for certain factor 274 
combinations. All analyses were performed using R software (version 3.1, R Core Team, 2014).  275 
10 
Results 276 
Did norms affect children’s donations? 277 
The norm format (condition: injunctive vs. descriptive) had no effect on children’s donations (Fig. 1). We 278 
found no effect of condition on donations (LRT, p = 0.8), no interaction between condition and treatment (p 279 
= 0.8) and no three-way interaction between condition x age x treatment (p = 0.9) when we examined 280 
children who had been tested in the two test conditions. Consequently, we collapsed our data across 281 
injunctive and descriptive conditions in order to test whether children’s donations were differentially 282 
affected by the generous and selfish target amounts when compared to the control. Our linear model 283 
showed that both age group (LRT, χ22 = 80.1, p < 0.001) and treatment (LRT, χ22 = 89.6, p < 0.001) were 284 
significant predictors of donations: older children tended to be more generous than younger children and 285 
children in the generous treatment gave more than children in the selfish treatment or control. Children in 286 
the selfish condition tended to give less than those in the control (β = -0.6), but this was not a significant 287 
effect in our minimal model (p = 0.07; Table 1). There was no interaction between age group and treatment 288 
(p = 0.2). 289 
To more directly compare patterns of children’s donations in each treatment relative to the control, 290 
we examined the relationship between age and donations specifically within the selfish and generous 291 
treatments (Fig. 1) by subsetting our data into two sets: (1) children in the selfish and control conditions 292 
and (2) children in the generous and control conditions. We then modeled donations as a function of age, 293 
treatment and the interaction between the two. Our first model examined children’s donations in the selfish 294 
vs. control condition and showed that children who received the selfish norm tended to give less than those 295 
in the control (Table S4). We also found that younger children were especially likely to show this 296 
distinction (LRT, age x treatment interaction, χ22 = 19.47, p = 0.044). Our second model examined 297 
children’s donations in the generous vs. control treatments. We found no interaction between age and 298 
treatment (p = 0.2). However, our reduced model showed that the oldest children gave more than the 299 
youngest children (LRT, age, χ22 = 33.91, p = 0.019; Table S4) and that children donated more in the 300 
generous condition compared to the selfish condition (LRT, treatment, χ21 = 18.20, p = 0.038; Table S4).  301 
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 302 
Figure 1. Mean donations of candies (out of ten) in an anonymous Dictator Game. Donations are shown by 303 
control (Con), descriptive (Des) and injunctive (Inj) conditions treatment, faceted by participant age group. 304 
Within the two norm conditions, children were either exposed to a selfish or generous norm. We used a 305 
between-subject design in which children were tested in a single condition/treatment combination. Children 306 
in the control condition received no treatment, as the control was run to measure baseline donations by age. 307 
Error bars show standard error. 308 
  309 
Table 1. Effects and standard errors from linear and generalized linear models predicting donations (Model 310 
1) and norm compliance (Models 2 and 3). Base levels for Models 1 and 3 were: Age group = 4&5; 311 
Treatment = Control. Base levels for Model 2 were: Age group = 4&5, Treatment = selfish. Table also 312 
shows goodness of fit. 313 
 
Model 1: 
Donations 
Model 2: 
Compliance to 
specified norms 
Model 3: 
Compliance to 
equality norm 
Intercept 2.55*** -0.11 -1.90*** 
 (0.31) (0.32) (0.42) 
Age group: 6&7 vs. 4&5 0.42 -0.63 0.72 
 (0.28) (0.46) (0.39) 
Age group: 8&9 vs. 4&5 1.33*** -1.44** 1.47*** 
 (0.29) (0.54) (0.38) 
Treatment: selfish vs. control -0.60  -0.53 
4&5 6&7 8&9
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Con Des Inj Con Des Inj Con Des Inj
Condition
Su
be
ct'
s d
on
at
ion
Treatment
Control
Selfish: Give 2
Generous: Give 8
12 
 (0.32)  (0.43) 
Treatment: generous vs. control (models 1 & 3); 
generous vs. selfish (model 2) 
0.70* 
(0.32) 
-2.93*** 
(0.63) 
0.65 
(0.39) 
R2 0.15   
Adj. R2 0.14   
Num. obs. 268 215 268 
AIC  158.40 294.16 
BIC  171.88 312.12 
Log Likelihood  -75.20 -142.08 
Deviance  150.40 284.16 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05  
 314 
Did the distributions of donations vary across treatment within age groups? 315 
Moving beyond an analysis of means, we now turned to an analysis of the broader distribution of donations 316 
within each age and condition. Within the youngest age group, the distribution of children’s donations 317 
showed variation across the norm treatments. Four- and five-year-old children who were presented with the 318 
selfish treatment made offers that were heavily skewed towards the selfish end of the spectrum when 319 
compared to children in the generous and control treatments (Fig. 2). We found differences between the 320 
selfish treatment and the control (K-S Test, D = 0.6, N = 56, p < 0.001) and between the generous and 321 
selfish treatments (K-S Test, D = 0.45, N = 71, p = 0.001) but not between the generous treatment and the 322 
control (p = 0.9). 323 
Within the middle age group, the distribution of donations varied to a lesser extent than in the 324 
youngest age group: offers in the selfish treatment were slightly skewed towards selfishness while offers in 325 
the generous treatment were slightly skewed towards equality (Fig. 2). Indeed, the distribution of donations 326 
varied across the generous and selfish treatments (K-S Test, D = 0.4, N = 76, p = 0.005), but not between 327 
either treatment and the control (ps > 0.3).  328 
Within the oldest age group, offers in the generous treatment were skewed towards equality when 329 
compared to offers in the selfish treatment and—to a lesser extent—the control treatment. Our tests showed 330 
that indeed the distributions between the selfish and generous treatment differed (K-S Test, D = 0.45, N = 331 
68, p = 0.002). The distributions of donations between the generous treatment and the control were 332 
marginally different (K-S Test, D = 0.4, N = 52, p = 0.055), but there was not a significant difference 333 
between the distributions of donations in the selfish versus control treatments (p = 0.7). 334 
 335 
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 336 
Figure 2. Density plots showing the distribution of Dictator Game donations (out of ten) across the selfish 337 
and generous treatments relative to the control condition. Density plots are faceted by age group.   338 
 339 
Were children more compliant with some norms than others? 340 
Our investigation of children’s compliance with the specified target amounts showed that (1) younger 341 
children were generally more compliant with target norms (LRT, age group, χ22 = 7.9, p = 0.019) and (2) 342 
children were more compliant with the selfish compared to generous norm (LRT, treatment, χ21 = 38.97, p 343 
< 0.001; Fig 3; Table 1). Indeed, we saw very little exact compliance with the generous norm; i.e., children 344 
rarely gave eight candies to their partner (Fig 3). Our GLMM showed no interaction between age group and 345 
treatment (p = 0.6). Children in the control condition were excluded from this analysis because they did not 346 
learn about a target amount. However, we conducted additional analyses to test whether receiving a norm 347 
treatment affected donations of the specified amount. To this end, we compared the frequency of exact 348 
compliance (gave exactly two, gave exactly 8) between children in the selfish and generous treatments 349 
compared to control children across the three age groups (Table S5).  These analyses showed that, within 350 
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the youngest age group, there was a greater frequency of children who gave exactly two candies in the 351 
treatments than in the control (χ2 = 10.46, p = 0.001).  352 
In addition to complying to target amounts, children may have been complying with a pre-existing 353 
norm of equality (i.e., giving 5 out of 10). To investigate this, we examined whether children who received 354 
one of the norm treatments were more likely to adhere to an equality norm compared to children in the 355 
control (Figure 3, right panel). Our GLMM again showed first order effects of age group (LRT, χ22 = 16.34, 356 
p < 0.001) and treatment (LRT, χ22 = 13.16, p < 0.01) but no interaction between the two (p = 0.14). Older 357 
children were more likely to share equally compared to younger children (Table 1). Children in the 358 
generous treatment were slightly more likely to give half than children in the control (β = 0.6) while 359 
children in the selfish treatment were slightly less likely to give half than children in the control (β = -0.5), 360 
but these were not significant effects (Ps > 0.09; Table 1).  Additionally, as above, we examined whether 361 
the frequency of compliance to an equality norm varied between children who had been exposed to a norm 362 
versus controls (Table S5). We found that, within the oldest age group, there was a marginally greater 363 
frequency of children who gave exactly five candies in the generous treatment compared to the control (χ2 364 
= 3.53, p = 0.06). 365 
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Figure 3. Percent of participants who complied exactly with the selfish or generous norms (left panel) and 367 
who complied exactly with an equality norm (right panel). Percentages are shown by participant age group 368 
and treatment. The left panel excludes participants in the control condition because they were not exposed 369 
to either norm.  370 
 371 
Discussion 372 
In this study we addressed two main questions. First, are children sensitive to selfish and generous norms of 373 
giving and, second, are they differentially influenced by injunctive versus descriptive information? Our 374 
results suggest that the answer to our first question is a resounding yes. Relative to their baseline giving in 375 
the control, children gave more candies to their partner when presented with the generous (give 8) norm 376 
and—to a lesser extent—gave fewer candies when presented with a selfish norm (give 2). However, 377 
contrary to predictions concerning age-related shifts in the weight accorded to different norm formats, 378 
children were not differentially influenced by either descriptive or injunctive norms. Instead, both kinds of 379 
norms moved children away from their baseline level of generosity to an equivalent degree.  380 
Why were descriptive and injunctive norms equally effective here? One (admittedly speculative) 381 
reason for this difference could be that as children are actively internalizing the norms that govern 382 
generosity, they remain open to all sources of information about what constitutes acceptable behavior. 383 
Indeed, both peers and authority figures represent reasonable sources of such information about the way the 384 
world works, and focusing on one at the expense of the other might not be an optimal strategy. By contrast, 385 
in line with Raihani and McAuliffe (2014), adults may be more selective about which norms they choose to 386 
follow, and more sensitive to injunctive norms in particular, because they are concerned with garnering 387 
social approval or concerned about the negative consequences of violating injunctive norms (or gains in 388 
upholding them). In other words, even if many or even most people are being selfish, if one ought to be 389 
generous there may still be gains to be made from following the injunctive norm, at least in some 390 
circumstances (for example, reputational gains or the avoidance of costs associated with non-compliance). 391 
On this account, then, children are equal-opportunity norm compliers, while adults are particularly swayed 392 
by injunctive information. 393 
Another possibility, however, is that children simply have difficulty distinguishing descriptive 394 
from injunctive norms. Some recent research, while not directly investigating this possibility, provides 395 
enough evidence to seriously entertain it. In particular, this work suggests that children might obscure the 396 
distinction in a particular manner, namely by inferring injunctive content from descriptive information. For 397 
example, a substantial program of research (reviewed in Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012) shows that children 398 
rapidly learn simple behavioral regularities such as how a puppet interacts with an object or the rules of a 399 
game. Despite the fact that the demonstrations from which they learn are “merely” descriptive in that no 400 
directly injunctive information is provided, children spontaneously protest subsequent deviations from the 401 
previously demonstrated behavior, suggesting that they have inferred injunctive content from the 402 
descriptive regularity. Even more generally, other recent work has shown that children readily infer 403 
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“ought” from “is” across a wide range of examples (Tworek & Cimpian, 2016), again suggesting a 404 
tendency to use descriptive information as evidence for injunctive information (and indeed this tendency 405 
may not go away entirely even in adults; e.g. Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009). All evidence is 406 
certainly not uniformly consistent with this possibility, however. Indeed, closer to our domain of resource 407 
allocation behavior, one recent study (DeJesus, Rhodes, & Kinzler, 2014) showed that while four and five-408 
year-olds’ judgments of how someone should and would distribute resources were identical, older children 409 
clearly differentiated the two kinds of judgments, in particular by thinking that others would distribute 410 
preferentially towards ingroup others even though they should distribute in line with a norm of fairness. 411 
And some of the research we reviewed previously also suggests that children distinguish what they ought to 412 
do from what they (or a third party) will do (Smith et a., 2013; Blake et al., 2014). There are many 413 
differences across these studies that make direct comparison difficult, but we see the question of whether 414 
and when children distinguish descriptive from injunctive norms as a critical area for future investigation. 415 
This is especially true given the argument that different modes of social transmission, and by extension 416 
different norm formats, should be expected to predominate at different points of development (Hewlett et 417 
al., 2011), a view which requires that children have the capacity to distinguish them in the first place.  418 
A more prosaic possibility for the lack of effect of norm format is that our design simply did not 419 
make the distinction between them salient enough. In the injunctive condition in our study, the 420 
Experimenter said “I think you should give 2/8”. This phrasing communicates the injunctive construction 421 
through the use of the word “should.” However, this phrasing leaves open the possibility that children 422 
considered this to be the opinion of the experimenter as opposed to a norm about what ought to be done 423 
more generally. If children did consider this information to be a subjective opinion, however, we might 424 
have expected to see a stronger effect of the descriptive norm compared to the ‘injunctive’ norm. Instead, 425 
both norms influenced children’s behavior to the same degree. Thus, we believe our injunctive phrasing 426 
successfully communicated a norm about what ought to be done generally. An interesting avenue for future 427 
work would be to test whether these norms exert differential effects in other contexts as they do in adults 428 
(Cialdini et al., 1990). For example, it is possible that these norms do not exert differential influences in the 429 
context of children’s giving behavior but might be differentially effective in other contexts such as which 430 
rules can be broken (e.g. you should tidy up your toys but no-one else has tidied up their toys) and which 431 
conventions should be followed (e.g. you should tuck in your shirt but no-one else has tucked in their 432 
shirts).  433 
Results from our distributional and compliance analyses highlighted two main age-related results. 434 
First, the distribution of children’s donations varied based on whether participants were exposed to a 435 
generous or selfish norm versus no norm. Specifically, 4- and 5-year-old children’s donations were 436 
particularly skewed by the selfish norm. Indeed, children in this youngest group were especially likely to 437 
show exact compliance with the selfish norm (i.e., many of them gave exactly two out of ten candies). This 438 
result is supported by our model predicting donations from only the subset of children who received the 439 
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selfish norm versus control, which showed a significant interaction between age and donation. This finding 440 
is also supported by the results from compliance analyses, which showed that, among the youngest 441 
children, donations of exactly two candies were more common in the selfish treatment than in the control.  442 
In contrast to the youngest age group, 8- and 9-year-old children’s donations were more skewed 443 
by the generous norm. Older children who were exposed to the generous norm were especially likely to 444 
give half of their candies to their partner, showing high levels of compliance with what was perhaps a pre-445 
existing norm of equality. Yet, interestingly, these children rarely showed exact compliance with the 446 
generous norm (i.e., they almost never donated eight out of ten candies). This pattern is also supported by 447 
our contingency table analysis, which showed a trend towards more frequent equal splits in the generous 448 
condition than in the control specifically among the oldest children. 449 
Our findings clearly show that generosity is flexible in children from early in development. 450 
However, they also demonstrate that this flexibility is constrained by pre-existing biases. Younger children, 451 
who tend to show a self-interested bias in the Dictator Game (Benenson et al., 2007), were particularly 452 
influenced by—and likely to comply exactly with—the selfish norm. This result suggests that the selfish 453 
norm had a licensing effect on their behavior; that is, 4- and 5-year-olds were more willing to be selfish if 454 
the experimenter explicitly condoned selfishness or if they learned that their peers tend to be selfish, 455 
perhaps because the match between norm and self-interest gave them cover to conform to that norm rather 456 
than a potentially competing norm of generosity or fairness which conflicted with self-interest. By contrast, 457 
older children were more influenced by the generous norm but refused to comply exactly with the target 458 
amount. Instead, the generous norm had the effect of pushing their donations towards equality. This finding 459 
is consistent with previous work that suggests that it is not until mid- to late-childhood that children begin 460 
to adhere to a norm of equality, even though younger children are aware of the norm (Blake et al., 2014; 461 
Smith et al., 2013). It is also consistent with cross-cultural work that suggests that around this period in 462 
development, children adopt adult-typical patterns of prosocial behavior (House et al., 2013). Our findings 463 
also suggest that it is not simply that younger children fail to spontaneously bring to mind a norm of which 464 
they are aware. That is, younger children’s failure to comply with norms that they think should apply to 465 
others and to themselves (e.g. Smith et al., 2013) is not a limitation of failing to activate a known norm, 466 
because even when we explicitly bring a norm to mind it fails to influence their behavior. Rather, generous 467 
norms appear to be ineffective in shifting younger children’s behavior even when they have been 468 
manipulated to think explicitly about it prior to acting. 469 
Our finding that children in the generous norm condition were slightly more likely to share equally 470 
than those in the control or selfish norm condition extends past work by showing that even as children 471 
begin to move towards equality, their behavior has not become rote but rather is still susceptible to external 472 
normative influences. Interestingly, however, children did not blindly comply with stated norms. Instead, 473 
they generally capped their generosity at an equal split. Broadly, the pattern of giving in 8- and 9-year old 474 
participants suggests that with a minimal amount of information children can be persuaded to engage in 475 
19 
 
costlier prosocial behavior than they would otherwise, but they place limits on the degree to which they 476 
accept such influence, essentially refusing to take a bad deal (i.e., to give so much that they would be left 477 
with less than half).  478 
Children in the middle age group—the 6- and 7-year-olds—present an interesting puzzle. 479 
According to our distributional analyses, these children were not influenced by either the selfish or 480 
generous norms compared to the control. However, the distribution of children’s responses did differ across 481 
selfish and generous treatments: offers were skewed towards selfishness in the selfish treatment and 482 
towards equality in the generous condition. These findings suggest that both norms exerted some influence, 483 
though to a lesser extent than in both younger and older children. While future work is necessary to 484 
understand why normative information was not as influential in this age range, we tentatively suggest that 485 
this is because 6- and 7-year-olds are in a transition stage, moving away from a self-focused default to a 486 
more egalitarian default; this state of more active internal conflict leads them to be less readily licensed by 487 
the selfish norm (as compared to younger children) but also less willing to give away a full half of their 488 
rewards (as compared to older children). In other words, for children in this age range, the pull of the 489 
generous norm is attenuated by a pre-existing desire to keep slightly more for oneself while the pull of the 490 
selfish norm is attenuated by the knowledge that one ought to share equally. 491 
In sum, our results demonstrate that children are sensitive to information that communicates 492 
norms of giving. However, this sensitivity shows age-related change, with younger children more 493 
influenced by selfishness and older children more influenced by generosity. Further, children’s receptivity 494 
to new normative information is constrained by their pre-existing biases, potentially including previously 495 
acquired norms of fairness. More broadly, our results begin to shed light on the ontogeny of giving 496 
behavior, and in particular its flexible tuning to local norms. Both information about what others are doing 497 
as well as information about what ought to be done likely contribute to the emerging differences in how 498 
children and adults engage in costly giving behavior. 499 
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